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tent to which an underlying contract will impact upon the limita-
tions period, however, there will continue to be confusion regarding
the statute of limitations applicable to such claims.
Edward Kelly
Article 32-Accelerated Judgment
CPLR 3211: Defendant's assertion of cross-claim against code-
fendant constitutes a waiver of his jurisdictional objection to that
codefendant's subsequent cross-claim
Before a state may subject a nondomiciliary to its judicial
processes, there must exist a predicate for jurisdiction. 9 In New
York, a party may attack the adequacy of the predicate by assert-
ing his jurisdictional defense either in a motion to dismiss the
cause of action or in the responsive pleading.30 It has been held
which adoption would have resulted in a 3-year period of limitations for malpractice actions
based on contract, indicates that a malpractice action arising from a contractual arrange-
ment may be brought within the 6-year statute of limitations.
2, See SIEGEL § 58, at 59; Homburger & Laufer, Appearance and Jurisdictional Mo-
tions in New York, 14 BuFFALo L. REv. 374, 374 (1964); Lacy, Personal Jurisdiction and
Service of Summons After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 O& L. REv. 505, 509 (1978); Note: Article
III of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules: Jurisdiction, Services and Appearance,
37 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 285, 320-28 (1963). In New York, personal jurisdiction may be ob-
tained over a nondomiciliary defendant if he is served with process somewhere within the
state. SiEGEL § 59, at 60; see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) (judgment in Oregon
state court held void for want of personal service of process on a nondomiciliary), overruled
on other grounds in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). An independent basis for in
personam jurisdiction must be established in instances where a nondomiciled defendant is
served with process outside the State of New York. See CPLR 301, 302, 313 (1972). If the
summons is served incorrectly upon the defendant within New York, the constitutional
predicate for jurisdiction nevertheless may be satisfied by an appearance on the part of the
defendant, since such appearance constitutes a waiver of the jurisdictional defense unless
the defendant reserves an objection to jurisdiction. See CPLR 320(b) (1972); Homburger &
Laufer, supra, at 375; SECOND ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFEMNCE ON THE CPLR (1964), in
TENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CONFERENcE 334-35 (1965); see also Legislaiion: CPLR
-Appearances, 31 BROoKLYN L. REv. 133, 134 (1964).
3o See Ranz v. Sposato, 106 Misc. 2d 156, 156, 431 N.Y.S.2d 239, 239 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1980). Section 3211(e) of the CPLR provides that an objection based upon lack of
jurisdiction "is waived if a party moves on any of the grounds set forth in subdivision (a)
without raising such objection or if, having made no objection under subdivision (a), he does
not raise such objection in the responsive pleading." CPLR 3211(e) (1970). Thus, a party
who makes a 3211(a) motion, but fails to challenge the court's in personam jurisdiction,
appears generally and waives any such objection. Roseman v. McAvoy, 92 Misc. 2d 1063,
1064, 401 N.Y.S.2d 988, 989; (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1978); Suriano v. Hosie, 59 Misc.
2d 973, 974, 302 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1969). In addition, if no motion
under 3211(a) is made, a defendant who neglects to raise a jurisdictional objection in his
answer is said to appear, thereby waiving the right to challenge personal jurisdiction.
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that a defendant who objects in the responsive pleading, but nev-
ertheless includes a counterclaim in such pleading, does not waive
his jurisdictional objection to the plaintiff's action. 1 Recently, in
Bartley v. Reedman,32 the Appellate Division, First Department,
held that a defendant's assertion of a cross-claim against a code-
fendant constitutes a waiver of his jurisdictional defense to that
codefendant's subsequent cross-claim, notwithstanding the defen-
dant's inclusion of such defense in the answer to the plaintiff's
complaint.33
In Bartley, the plaintiff, a passenger in one of the vehicles in-
volved in a three-car collision, commenced an action against all
three drivers in the Supreme Court of New York County.3 4 In his
answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant Duplisea, a non-
domiciliary of New York, asserted the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction 35 and interposed cross-claims against his codefend-
ants." A cross-claim thereupon was asserted against Duplisea by
one of the other codefendants. 37 Duplisea, answering the cross-
claim, denied the charges but failed to reallege his jurisdictional
defense.3 8 A number of years after the plaintiff's actions against
Wahrhaftig v. Space Design Group, Inc., 29 App. Div. 2d 699, 699-700, 286 N.Y.S.2d 442,
443-44 (3d Dep't 1968). Indeed, it has been stated that a jurisdictional objection should be
made by way of motion so as to avoid a subsequent, inadvertent waiver of such defense. See
CPLR 320, commentary at 368-69 (1972); Italian Colony Restaurant, Inc. v. Wershals, 45
App. Div. 2d 841, 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (2d Dep't 1974).
31 E.g., Goodman v. Solow, 27 App. Div. 2d 920, 920, 279 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (1st Dep't
1967), appeal denied, 20 N.Y.2d 646, 231 N.E.2d 789, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1967); M. Katz &
Son Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G. Correale & Sons, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 52, 54, 270 N.Y.S.2d
672, 674 (1st Dep't 1966), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 903, 905, 232 N.E.2d 864, 865, 285 N.Y.S.2d 871,
872 (1967); Buckley & Kisseloff v. Feldcos Realty Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 718, 719, 315 N.Y.S.2d
732, 734 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970) ("it would be patently unfair and illogical to
compel a resident . . . to elect between a defense of want of . . . jurisdiction and a
counterclaim").
32 86 App. Div. 2d 820, 446 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1st Dep't 1982) (per curiam).
Id. at 821, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 274. The initial cross-claimant, Duplisea, alleged that the
court lacked in personam jurisdiction over him on the ground that service of process was not
effected properly. Id. at 820, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
34 Id. The car driven by Duplisea collided with the vehicle driven by Bond, the code-
fendant against whom Duplisea asserted his cross-claim. Id. Bond's automobile, in turn, was
propelled into the vehicle driven by Reedman. Id. The injured plaintiff was a passenger in
Bond's car. Id.
$3 Id.
3, Id. Duplisea alleged in his cross-claim that his liability, if any, was "secondary to and
derivative of" the liability attributable to Reedman and Bond. Id.
37 Id. Bond interposed a cross-claim against Duplisea, contending that any liability she
may have incurred was secondary to and derivative of Duplisea's. Id.
" Id. Prior to 1977, section 3011 of the CPLR required that all affirmative claims be
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Duplisea and the other defendants were dismissed,39 Duplisea
moved to have his codefendant's cross-claim dismissed on jurisdic-
tional grounds.40 The Supreme Court, New York County, however,
denied the motion.41
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department affirmed
in a per curiam opinion.42 The court initially observed that the
claim asserted by the defendant Duplisea was interposed against a
codefendant who had not yet sought relief from Duplisea, rather
than against the plaintiff who brought him into the action.43 Thus,
the court distinguished the present situation from one in which the
defendant asserts a counterclaim. 4" Additionally, the court de-
clared, "had Duplisea not originally asserted an affirmative claim,"
accompanied by either an answer or reply. CPLR 3011, commentary at 85-86 (Supp. 1981-
1982); see, e.g., Bides v. Abraham & Strauss Div. of Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 33 App.
Div. 2d 569, 305 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2d Dep't 1969). The section 3011 requirement was altered in
1977 by an amendment which was prompted by the decision in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30
N.Y.2d 143, 148-49, 282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (1972) (allowing apportion-
ment of liability among defendants). The holding of that case imposed upon codefendants
additional burdens to prepare and serve mandatory answers. FIFTEENTH ANN. RE'. OF THE
Jun. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1977), in TWENTY-SEcoND ANN. REP. N.Y. Jun. CoNRa-
ENcE 268-69 (1977). Pursuant to the new section 3011, Duplisea was not required to inter-
pose an answer to Bond's cross-claim unless the cross-claim demanded an answer, since a
cross-claim is "deemed denied or avoided" if no demand is made and no answer is provided.
CPLR 3011 (Supp. 1981-1982); see id., commentary at 85-86.
11 86 App. Div. 2d at 820, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 273. The plaintiff's actions against Duplisea
and Reedman were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Id. Bond's motion to dismiss the
complaint on jurisdictional grounds, however, was denied because of the doctrine of laches.
Id.
40 Id. Duplisea moved to dismiss Bond's cross-claim, which had been served 7 years
earlier, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over such claim. Id. Duplisea
contended that jurisdiction was lacking since the plaintiff's complaint against him was dis-
missed upon that same ground. Id.
41 Id.
" Id. Joining in the per curiam order were Justices Lupiano, Bloom and Fein. Justice
Silverman wrote a dissenting opinion in which Presiding Justice Sullivan joined.
43 Id., 447 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
"" Id. at 821, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 274. In New York, a defendant who asserts a counterclaim
in his responsive pleading does not thereby waive any jurisdictional challenge that he has
made to the plaintiff's complaint. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. In M. Katz &
Sons Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G. Correale & Sons, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 52, 270 N.Y.S.2d 672
(1st Dep't 1966), the first department rejected, as obsolete, a 1907 Supreme Court determi-
nation to the contrary. Id. at 53, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 673; see Merchants Heat & Light Co. v.
Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 289 (1907). The Bartley court, however, distinguished the asser-
tion of a cross-claim from the filing of a counterclaim upon the ground that the latter is
interposed against a party who initially brought the defendant into the action. 86 App. Div.
2d at 821, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 274. Indeed, the court boldly concluded that "[an affirmative
assertion of jurisdiction against a party who has not brought one into the action constitutes
a waiver of jurisdiction with respect to the claims at issue between them." Id.
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he could have relied upon his jurisdictional objection to the plain-
tiff's complaint in order to defeat the cross-claim lodged against
him by his codefendant.45 Finally, the court noted that Duplisea
could not validly replead the jurisdictional defense in his response
to the codefendant's cross-claim, since he already had asserted a
cross-claim against that codefendant."'
Writing for the dissent, Justice Silverman argued that the
cross-claim asserted against Duplisea should be dismissed since it
was derivative, both substantively and jurisdictionally, from the
plaintiff's claim, which itself was dismissed.47 Moreover, the dis-
sent urged, since Duplisea's cross-claim was contained in his an-
swer to the plaintiff's complaint, and such answer asserted the lack
of jurisdiction defense, the codefendant had notice of Duplisea's
jurisdictional challenge.4s Finally, Justice Silverman questioned the
court's disparate treatment of cross-claims and counterclaims
under factually similar circumstances, stating that "no distinction"
exists between the two situations.49
", 86 App. Div. at 820, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 274. But see Bides v. Abraham & Strauss Div. of
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 33 App. Div. 2d 569, 569, 305 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (2d Dep't
1969) (defendant may not rely upon his jurisdictional objection to the plaintiff's complaint,
but rather must reassert the jurisdictional defense in his answer to the codefendant's cross-
claim).
4, 86 App. Div. 2d at 821, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
47 Id. at 822, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 275 (Silverman, J., dissenting). Justice Silverman con-
tended that the cross-claim interposed against Duplisea was jurisdictionally derivative of
the plaintiff's action because jurisdiction over the cross-claim was "obtained by the service
of plaintiffs' summons." Id. (Silverman, J., dissenting). Indeed, the dissent observed, "[n]o
summons was attempted to be served in connection with Bond's cross-claim against
Duplisea." Id. (Silverman, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Silverman stated that the
cross-claim against Duplisea was substantively derivative of the plaintiff's claim insofar as
the cross-claim demanded indemnification "if [the] plaintiffs succeeded against [Bond]."
Id. (Silverman, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Addressing the dissents characteriza-
tion of Bond's cross-claim against Duplisea as substantively derivative of the plaintiff's com-
plaint, the majority stated that the various cross-claims sought "apportionment of liability
depending upon the negligence of each of the vehicles." Id. at 821, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
Thus, concluded the court, "[d]espite the form of the pleadings, the claim [by Bond] could
not be one for indemnification." Id.
" Id. at 822, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 275 (Silverman, J., dissenting). Justice Silverman objected
to the "unnecessarily technical and... unfair trap" of punishing Duplisea for failing to
allege his jurisdictional objection to Bond's cross-claim, asserting that notice of such defense
was given to Bond by virtue of service upon him of Duplisea's answer to the plaintiff's
complaint. Id. (Silverman, J., dissenting).
4" Id. (Silverman, J., dissenting). The dissent recognized that the Second Department's
decision in Bides v. Abraham & Strauss Div. of Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 33 App. Div.
2d 569, 569, 305 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (2d Dep't 1969); see infra text accompanying notes 50-
51, fully supported the majority's conclusion. 86 App. Div. 2d at 822, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 275
(Silverman, J., dissenting). Justice Silverman stated, however, that neither Bides nor Bar-
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It appears that the Bartley decision is a logical extension of
the Second Department's holding in Bides v. Abraham & Strauss
Division of Federated Department Stores, Inc.,5 e in which the
court determined that a failure to assert a jurisdictional defense in
an answer to a cross-claim constitutes a waiver of that defense,
notwithstanding the dismissal of the plaintiff's action on jurisdic-
tional grounds. 1 It should be noted, however, that the Bartley
waiver primarily was predicated upon Duplisea's affirmative asser-
tion of a cross-claim, rather than upon his failure to reallege the
jurisdictional defense in his answer to the codefendant's cross-
claim.52 Notwithstanding this difference between the theoretical
underpinnings of Bides and Bartley, it is submitted that the fac-
tual contours of both cases demanded determinations contrary to
those rendered. Indeed, it appears that where no additional parties
are brought into the action, and the various cross-claims contain
demands and allegations arising from the same factual circum-
stances as those underlying the principal action, no waiver should
result either from the failure to replead a jurisdictional defense in
an answer to a cross-claim or from the assertion of the cross-claim
itself.5 3 Adoption of this view, it is suggested, would eliminate the
tley is reconcilable with cases holding that the assertion of a counterclaim is not deemed to
be a waiver of jurisdictional challenges. See id. (Silverman, J., dissenting); supra notes 31 &
44 and accompanying text.
50 33 App. Div. 2d 569, 305 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2d Dep't 1969).
' Id. at 569, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 338. In Bides, the plaintiff instituted an action against the
defendant-department store to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of tripping
over a loose carpet. Id., 305 N.Y.S.2d at 337. Perlman, a codefendant, served an answer to
the plaintiff's complaint, asserting lack of personal jurisdiction as an affirmative defense. Id.
The defendant-department store served a cross-complaint upon Perlman, who then served
an answer to the cross-claim. Id. Perlman's answer, however, failed to assert his jurisdic-
tional objection. Id. The court held that despite Perlman's inclusion of a jurisdictional chal-
lenge in his answer to the plaintiff's complaint, his failure to assert such objection in his
answer to the cross-claim constituted a waiver of that defense as against the department
store. Id., 305 N.Y.S.2d at 338. For various discussions of the Bides decision, see CPLR 320,
commentary at 369-70 (1972); 4 WK&M 1 3211.04, at 32-36 to 32-37; McLaughlin, New
York Practice, 1970 Survey of New York Law, 22 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 55, 71-72 (1970).
I 86 App. Div. 2d at 821, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 274. Although the Bides and Bartley courts
utilized different rationales, Bartley relied almost exclusively upon Bides in order to sup-
port its conclusion. See id.
See Italian Colony Restaurant, Inc. v. Wershals, 45 App. Div. 2d 841, 841, 358
N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (2d Dep't 1974) (jurisdictional defense is not waived by assertion of any
related counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim); Majique Fashions Ltd. v. Warwick
& Co., 96 Misc. 2d 808, 811, 409 N.Y.S.2d 581, 583-84 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978) (jurisdic-
tional objection is not waived since no additional parties were joined in the action and
claims arose from the same facts surrounding the original complaint), rev'd on other
grounds, 67 App. Div. 2d 321, 414 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 1979). It should be noted that
[Vol. 57:178
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unnecessary distinction presently existing between cross-claims
and counterclaims, both of which often involve claims arising from
the same congeries of facts as those underlying the plaintiff's suit,
and neither of which requires the joinder of any additional
parties."
Significantly, the Bartley court suggested that any waiver of a
jurisdictional objection by reason of an affirmative assertion of a
cross-claim may be avoided if the cross-claimant reserves such de-
fense in the cross-claim itself.5 5 It is apparent, however, that this
reservation requirement serves no useful purpose, since the cross-
defendant is served with the cross-claimant's answer to the plain-
jurisdictional challenges may be waived in situations which are unrelated to the Bides and
Bartley controversies. See, e.g., Gurbuzer v. Schulman, 80 App. Div. 2d 632, 633, 436
N.Y.S.2d 89, 90 (2d Dep't 1981) (defendant executrix's entrance into stipulation of substitu-
tion for decedent constituted consent to the court's jurisdiction). But cf. Renewal Prods.,
Inc. v. Kleen-Stik Prods., Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 645, 646, 251 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779-80 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1964) (stipulation extending time to answer a complaint is not an appear-
ance). Additionally, it has been held that a defendant's motion for summary judgment on a
counterclaim, after the plaintiff's action has been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, consti-
tutes a waiver of "its previously sustained jurisdictional objection." Flaks Zaslow & Co. v.
Bank Computer Network Corp., 66 App. Div. 2d 363, 366-67, 413 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1st Dep't
1979). In Flaks, therefore, the plaintiff was permitted to amend its reply to the counterclaim
and reassert all of the allegations originally set forth in its complaint. Id.; see also Goodman
v. Solow, 27 App. Div. 2d 920, 920, 279 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (1st Dep't 1967). But cf. Ham-
mond v. Hammond, 9 App. Div. 2d 615, 616, 190 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741 (1st Dep't 1959) (courts
should dispense expeditiously with the assertion of a jurisdictional challenge at the begin-
ning of the litigation).
"See Majique Fashions Ltd. v. Warwick & Co., 96 Misc. 2d 808, 811, 409 N.Y.S.2d
581, 583-84 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 67 App. Div. 2d 321, 414
N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 1979). In Majique, the court stated:
[The defendant] properly raised the defense of lack of jurisdiction as an affirma-
tive defense in its answer. This defense was not waived by interposing counter-
claims and cross claims in the answer since no new parties were joined and all
such counterclaims and cross claims asserted by this defendant arose out of the
same transaction as that sued upon by the plaintiff.
96 Misc. 2d at 811, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 583-84. A counterclaim may assert any cause of action,
not necessarily one arising out of the transaction which is the subject of the plaintiff's claim,
and may be interposed against one or more plaintiffs. CPLR 3019(a) (1974); CPLR 3019,
commentary at 216 (1974). Cross-claims may be asserted by a defendant against "one or
more defendants, a person whom a defendant represents or a defendant and other persons
alleged to be liable." CPLR 3019(b) (1974). The subject of a cross-claim need not be related
to the plaintiff's original allegations and demands. Id. 3019, commentary at 225 (1974). Con-
tra FEn. R. Civ. P. 13(g) (cross-claim must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as
the original action or counterclaim, or must be related to the property which is the subject
matter of the original action). For discussions of the nature and function of counterclaims
and cross-claims, see SEGEL § 227, at 273-75; Note, Parties and Pleadings Under the CPLR,
31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 98, 110-12 (1964).
5 See 86 App. Div. 2d at 821, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
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tiff's complaint" and, thus, presumably receives adequate notice
that the cross-claimant possesses a jurisdictional defense. Indeed,
it is submitted that the majority, by erecting such a requirement,
has created little more than a procedural trap for the unwary prac-
titioner. It is hoped, therefore, that the Court of Appeals will reex-
amine both Bartley and Bides in light of the policy favoring join-
der of claims,5  judicial economy,s5  and basic fairness in the
administration of justice. Until it does so, however, defendants
who have a jurisdictional challenge should be aware that the asser-
tion of a cross-claim which does not reserve a jurisdictional defense




Ins. Law § 167(8): Insurer's failure to disclaim liability or deny
coverage as soon as is reasonably possible does not result in cover-
age where the insurance carrier has insured neither the person
nor the vehicle involved in an automobile accident
Section 167(8) of the Insurance Law requires a liability insurer
to give to a claimant written notice of its disclaimer of liability or
See CPLR 2103(e) (1976).
See CPLR 320, commentary at 368-69 (1972). If an answer contains a jurisdictional
objection, it nevertheless may include counterclaims and cross-claims. Id. 3011 (1974). As-
suming that a cross-claim is asserted in an answer which contains a jurisdictional challenge
to the plaintiff's complaint, it is clear that the cross-defendant will receive notice of such
objection since every party appearing in an action receives copies of all papers served upon
the other parties to that suit. See id. 2103(e) (1976).
58 See CPLR 601 (1976 & Supp. 1981-1982). Under the Civil Practice Act, disputes
between codefendants that were independent of the plaintiff's claim could not be asserted in
a cross-claim. See id. 601, commentary at 164-65 (1976). The CPLR, on the other hand,
permits any controversy between codefendants to be the subject of a cross-claim. Id. 601
(1976 & Supp. 1981-1982). Notably, if the rights of any party appear to be prejudiced by a
joinder of claims, the court may order separate tiials. See Note, supra note 54, at 110-11;
see also Newburgh v. Clarendon Gardens, Inc., 33 Misc. 2d 436, 436, 227 N.Y.S.2d 233, 233-
34 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962) (severance ordered if joinder will prejudice substantial
rights or cause confusion at trial).
, See CPLR 601 (1976) (joinder of claims); id. 602 (consolidation of actions); see also
Saunders v. Saunders, 54 Misc. 2d 1081, 1083, 283 N.Y.S.2d 969, 971 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1967) (public policy favoring complete relief in one action and avoidance of multiplicity of
suits); Kalmanowitz v. Solomon, 22 Misc. 2d 988, 989, 198 N.Y.S.2d 928, 931 (N.Y.C. Mun.
Ct. N.Y. County 1960) (joinder of action to reduce caseload of the court and its personnel
and to avoid waste of time, money and manpower).
